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1. Introduction
Of course it is not a word, this “dediction”; at least, not yet. But why not? As
the story goes, James Joyce was once asked whether his habit of inventing words
was because there were not enough words in the English language. He answered
that there were enough words, just not the right words. To see whether “dediction”
might be a “right word”, I begin by considering related terms, and then consider
what they do for us—why do they exist and my new term, “dediction”, does not?
For example, if we construct for ourselves a simple list of Latinate roots related to
writing and seeing, and then add time-related prefixes, we could quickly come up
with “post-script”, “describe”, “description,” “prescribe”, and “prescription”, among
others. (“Depict” and “depiction” come to mind as well, but their treatment is beyond
my scope here.) If we then do the same for speaking, we have no trouble recognising
“predict” and “prediction”, but what about “postdict” and “postdiction” or “dedict”
and “dediction”?
Recalling one of the previous words that I discussed here, “expectation” (Futures,
32:7 September 2000), we may begin to see the answer to the questions above.
Prediction may of course be founded upon expectation, to good or ill consequence.
As Bertrand Russell noted, “Domestic animals expect food when they see the person
who usually feeds them. We know that all these rather crude expectations of uniform-
ity are liable to be misleading. The man who has fed the chicken every day through-
out its life at last wrings its neck instead.” [1, p. 21] Is it largely the repetition of
patterns that gives us the sense of expectation? Can we consequently say that the
perception of patterns allows us to feel that we can predict?
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Regarding the notion of expectation, at section 465 of his Philosophical Investi-
gations, Ludwig Wittgenstein writes:
“An expectation is so made that whatever happens has to accord with it, or
not.”Suppose you now ask: then are facts defined one way or the other by an
expectation—that is, is it defined for whatever event may occur whether it fulfils
the expectation or not? The answer has to be: “Yes, unless the expression of the
expectation is indefinite; for example, contains a disjunction of different possi-
bilities.” [2]
It is precisely here—in the disjunction of different possibilities—that we may
locate some virtual space that opens for multiple futures. It is a space in the matrix
of time-plus-speech words. My invented word—”dediction”—works as a placeholder
in one of those spaces. And “dediction” does much more than that. It calls attention
to the artificial (and to my mind, wrong), normative distinctions among such words
as “description”, “prescription”, and “prediction”. Regarding Wittgenstein’s point,
to say that “facts” are defined by expectations is to make a statement that runs counter
to our usual conceptions of facts. Especially in the sciences, we treat facts as though
they are determined by the material world. This conception ignores the necessity of
interpretation that accompanies the material world such that we can arrive at some-
thing and call it a “fact”. Therefore, I maintain that facts are constructed by argu-
ments, not things. Yes, but the material world remains a recalcitrant limitation in
arguments, one may insist. No more than the social world, I would counter. To
illustrate, while thinking about “expectation”, I came across the headline “Death
Rates at Four Hospitals Higher Than Expected.” [3] What could that mean? How
do we create such expectations? By announcing a count of past events (deaths), and
stating the time at which to count them (the present) such that we can say that they
did or did not meet a pre-diction from the past (expectation). I checked with a hospi-
tal official in the region as to how such expectations are created, and he told me
that they are created by categorising types of procedures, such as heart surgery,
and then counting, nation-wide (or sometimes regionally), the number of procedures
attempted and the number of survivors. No account is taken of the difference in
condition of the patient, the skills or education of the physician and nurses, the
technology available, the wealth or poverty of the neighbourhood in which the hospi-
tal is located, et cetera.
There is a stronger point to be made beyond this relatively simple point regarding
the prediction, description, and the creation of expectations. This stronger point is
that these deceivingly simple words which couple time and writing, or time and
speaking, also connote powerful normative positions.
An expectation is thus made possible because we have spoken our belief in
advance of an event—we have pre-dicted. Prediction, thought of in this way, is the
marking in time of the moment when we move from speaking of the past, in the
present, to create a future. In this way, “prediction” can be thought of as the word
we use while making firm an otherwise unspoken belief—an “expectation”. But what
is “expectation” if not a linguistic framework? With the prefixes “de-” and “pre-”,
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we comfortably set the markers of the past and the future, respectively. A pure
mechanics of language would suggest that by adding these prefixes to “-dict”, we
ought to be symbolising our talk about the past or the future. And by adding these
prefixes to “-script”, we ought to be symbolising our writing about the past or future.
It is worth noting that Latour and Woolgar in their Laboratory Life characterise
technological apparatus in a scientific laboratory as “inscription devices”, because it
is through these devices that arguments can be brought forth. “Inscription”, in this
sense, is “not so much a transferring of information as a material operation of cre-
ating order”. [4, p. 245]
Taking symbols in the oral and the written together, with “description” and “pre-
diction”, the simple mechanics of meaning brought about by adding a suffix to a base-
word seems to work; not so with “prescription”. With “prescription”, a normative
connotation is introduced which adds a different layer of meaning to the simple
mechanics of a time-focussed prefix and a base-word denoting writing or speaking.
And it is precisely because we do add connotative meaning beyond the denotation
suggested by simple mechanics, that I want to introduce “dediction” to the matrix.
This artificial introduction makes conscious the otherwise unconscious process of
adding or inventing connotations. One might look to politics, race, gender, econom-
ics, or other social forces to explain how audiences invest meaning. But by operation
of language alone, Wittgenstein shows us how “expectation” helps to create the mode
of the future. And because the operation of language can do this, we ought closely
to examine those words that pretend to refer only to the abstract vagaries of language
itself, but in practice, tend, if not portend, to create normative comportments. With
description and prescription, normative comportments are created through references
to time. Therefore I want to ask, why not “dediction”?
2. Creating connotations—the time of the signs
Here I must be careful not to suggest some linear origin story. Saussure cautions:
Language at any given time involves an established system and an evolution. At
any given time, it is an institution in the present and a product of the past. At
first sight, it looks very easy to distinguish between the system and its history,
between what is and what it was. In reality, the connexion between the two is so
close that it is hard to separate them. Would matters be simplified if one con-
sidered the ontogenesis of linguistic phenomena, beginning with a study of chil-
dren’s language, for example? No. It is quite illusory to believe that where langu-
age is concerned the problem of origins is any different from the problem of
permanent conditions. There is no way out of the circle. [5, p. 24 in original pagi-
nation]
To begin simply, I look to the Oxford English Dictionary (“OED”—Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1989) to locate the likely first use of these, and related words. It is
not that the OED is the truth in some a priori way, but rather that as a culturally-
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received, powerful and pervasive repository of the English word, it serves as an
anchoring point for investigations of the word. In the OED, the following years are
assigned to the following words as being the first-found use: “description”, 1380,
from “describe”, Latin, de+scribere (to write), and preceded in ME by “descrive”.
The earliest reference to “describe” in the sense of “to set forth by characteristics”
is 1513. The earliest reference of it in the sense of “to write down” is 1526. “Prescrip-
tion”—writing beforehand—was used in the 1540s, as was “prescribe”. Quite rel-
evant for my purposes is the fact that the same etymological root generates the
normative or moral sense of “prescribe”. As of 1579, we find “prescription” used
to indicate a physician’s written orders. Did writing it down make it imperative?
Here Plato’s objections in the Phaedrus dialogue are called to mind. The written
word, according to Plato, does not serve to aid or create memory, but rather only
to remind us of what we already know. [6, sections 275a–b] In making this critique
of the informative sense of acts of communication, Plato does not explore what
ramifications writing may have for the moral or normative sense of acts of communi-
cation.
To complete the matrix, one finds in the OED that “predict” is first recorded as
having been used to mean “say beforehand” in 1611, and was made a verb by Milton,
although “prediction”, was already recognised as a noun in 1561. One finds “post-
script” used in 1551, and “postscribe” in 1614; but “postdiction”—to assert some-
thing about the past—was only introduced in 1940 with specific dialectic reference
to “prediction”, a fact I take as evidence to support my method of investigation here.
At that time, J. Laird, in Theism & Cosmology, states “If however, the future be
indeterminate before it occurs, it cannot be fixed before it occurs. For there is nothing
determinate to fix. Hence inferential prediction has quite a different status from infer-
ential post-diction.”
From their simple etymologies, the words “prescribe”, “describe” and “predict”
help to create a matrix that yields an interpretive space—a space that the reader will







(There are words about communication not determined by time as well, both
spoken, such as “inter–dict”, “a–dict”, and “e–dict”, and written, such as “inter–
scribe”, “a–scibe”, and a neologism which I have created to mean electronic
communication, “e–scribe”.)
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Separating these terms into simple components, we find two roots—one for writing
(“-scription”), the other for speaking (“-diction”). For writing, we have prefixes that
place the writing temporally before something else (prescription), one that places
the writing contemporaneous with something else (description), and one that places
the writing after something else (postscription). So too, for speaking: we have pre-
fixes that place the speaking before something else (prediction), and after something
else (postdiction), but noticeably absent is the contemporaneous counterpart of
description—”dediction”. This hole causes me to pause and wonder, and as I wonder
about what I perceive to be a lack here—due to my expectation, I am also struck
by the other meanings that the words in the matrix have in addition to their temporal
senses. And still more important are the seemingly neutral senses of temporality that
permits us our apathy. We let the normative connotation drift by as the uninterrogated
shadow of the sturdy temporal denotation.
The vertical divide on this matrix seems to be one that separates the written from
the spoken word. If we compare the use, impact and meanings of the written versus
the spoken, we may see that perhaps Plato was right when, through the words of
Socrates, he ranted against the written word in his Phaedrus dialogue: “If men learn
this [writing], it will implant forgetfulness on their souls; they will cease to exercise
memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to remembrance
no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks.” [6, section
275a]. Plato’s position on language and its various forms continues to be echoed in
Neil Postman’s Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology1 and Sven
Birkert’s2 The Gutenberg Elegies: The Fate of Reading in an Electronic Age. If
Plato’s prediction was correct in saying that the Athenians would lose oral eloquence
due to writing, it would seem that he was only wrong in stopping there.
Italo Calvino bemoans the “pestilence” that has befallen both written and oral
language as a “loss”. [7, p. 56] By inventing “de-diction” and comparing it to the
full development of the written word with “prescription”, “description” and
“postscript(ion)” may illustrate our loss of focus on speaking. As indicia of this loss,
can we take the facts that we have developed a full temporal root, stalk and flower
for written communication, but for oral counterparts have only the dormant seed of
“prediction”? And with that loss, (or failure to develop), the seed, root, stalk and
flower have adapted over generations to their environmental condition that privileges
the word. As Michel Foucault and many other contemporary theorists have noted,
connotations are held in place by living language power structures of the time. What
might we observe about the words in this matrix, which would serve as evidence of
this power relationship, and demonstrate variations away from meanings derived
from their simple structure of time-plus-writing or speaking?
“Pre-scription”, for example, has a very normative capacity about it, extending to
both the written word and the oral word. “Description” takes on a sense not only
of time—writing about the present, but also of neutrality. It suggests an ability in
1 New York: Vintage Books, 1993.
2 London: Faber & Faber, 1994.
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our language to attach words to things in a neutral way or we might say (since
Descartes), in an “objective” way. We must ask ourselves what cultural pressures
exist in our language environment to turn the meaning in this way? What purposes
are served by a word which not only connotes neutrality, but has been put in place
or held in place or left in place with a plausible connection to writing, where for
speaking we have none? The artificiality of placing “dediction” in the matrix would
send us back to “description” wanting to know why “description” means more than
“writing in the present” (literally, “of writing”). Moreover, if we stay on the same
side of the oral-written vertical divide on the matrix and go back to “pre-scription”,
we find a further important connotative difference, of which we must query the
cultural pressures that necessitated adaptation. While “pre-diction” connotes saying
and writing how things will be before they are, “pre-scription” connotes saying and
writing how things ought to be before they are.
Apparently Hume said, “a description of existing facts never logically entails a
moral judgement”. [8, p. 112.] I must disagree with Hume on this. With reference
to the example, the question is “why choose to re-tell those facts? (versus, for
example, other facts). It is that sort of selection process that creates a framework,
perhaps even a matrix, within which to consider the facts. The dimensions of the
framework, which serve to enframe or include descriptions, also serve to exclude
other descriptions—a normative function. In the standard oath used for witnesses in
most courts of law in the United States, the witness must swear not only that he or
she will tell the truth, but that he or she will tell the whole truth. Telling the whole
truth, if that is what telling the truth means, requires a witness to have a sense of
all that is relevant to the point at issue. And insofar as this is regarded as a standard,
it is treated as though it is surely the case that the judge, the lawyers, the witnesses,
the parties and everyone present will have the same sense, more or less, of what is
relevant. Simply giving some of the facts will not do—the truth (as understood to
be the whole truth)—can only be told when one understands the normative standard
of all that ought to be included as relevant to that truth. Thus, the descriptive act is
indeed a prescriptive one, and in the case of the courtroom, is the prescriptive
response to the oath’s prescriptive call. So while I remain indebted to Hume for his
indictments of both induction and deduction, I must disagree with his position here.
Hume provides us with a good example of the language environment—formal
logic—that is benefited by accommodating “description” to a neutral position—at
least a morally neutral position. But that language environment is not the vernacular
or vulgar language environment by which we live our lives in creating meanings.
Writing may corrupt the mind and its ability to remember in the same way in
which hand-held calculators corrupt a person’s numeracy, or that electronic texts
corrupt one’s literacy. More important for this investigation is the fact that the physi-
cal existence of the written word helps to assign and entrench connotations. Today
at least, we find a need to translate Plato as having explicit concern with description
and prescription. In The Laws, Plato’s Athenian says (in what we now recognise as
post-16th century translation, given the OED’s etymologies): “Thus you see that
while it would be wrong to call these various subjects incapable of description, it
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is very right to call them incapable of prescription, for prescription can throw no
light on their contents.” [6, chapter XII, section 968e.]
The temporal sense of being able to say what will happen before it happens (pre-
dict) gives us the normative ethos of saying what should happen (pre-scribe). But
we often do not speak of what will happen in certain, or absolute terms. Twentieth
century quantum physics, and most of science in the Comtean cascade from physics,
focuses on probabilities, not certainties, and such common daily concerns as econom-
ics and weather are always discussed in probability terms. In this conditional mode
of probability, prediction takes on the quality of what should happen, given the
applicable probability calculation, not what will happen. Once the realm of should
is entered, it is easy to see how ambiguity between normative and probable should
develop. From there, one could use a reverse logic that goes something like this:
We do not have “dediction” because we recognise that “pre-diction” means both the
present and the future—as with description; it so thoroughly includes prescription
that it too is redundant. Why do we hang on to it? I am presenting “dediction” mostly
as an heuristic device, possibly because, to borrow from Joyce, it is one of the “right”
words, but not simply because we need more words.
One of the common topoi of classical Greek rhetoric was definition. It certainly
still is today. (I should emphasise that it is nothing more than a common topus.) I
might say that “pre-diction” literally means to speak before. Typically then, the sense
of the word “prediction” is to speak of an event before the event happens. If the
speaking-before is sufficiently similar to the occurring-after, we say that the speak-
ing-before is “pre-diction”. But the judgement and interpretation that we exercise in
comparing the occurring-after with the speaking-before is loose and accommodating.
[9, p. 21.] What then, by comparison, would be the definition of de-diction? “Speak-
ing possible futures into existence today.” This may sound like a very weak defi-
nition, including just about all possibilities and excluding none. But that is not the
case. With every formulation that recalls a past or re-enforces a present, an uncon-
scious line is drawn to a particular future. Not all of the possible futures are part of
this drama. Some are purposely excluded; others simply do not ever come to be
heard. The choice to speak particular facts today does limit the possibilities in the
future, and with the selection of facts we speak into existence today, we have selected
which futures can be. That selection is therefore a normative act. So through the
artificial addition of “dediction” to the matrix, we can make an analogy to another
part of the matrix—as a proportion. So the invention of “de-diction” shows us not
only that all dediction is pre-diction, but also that all description is pre-scription.
This brings us back to Plato’s Gorgias dialogue. There, with the support of charac-
ters Thamus and Theuth, Socrates speaks against the written word in ways similar
to those who since have spoken against other new media of communication—the
radio, the phonograph, the television, talking films, the computer, the hand-held cal-
culator. [6, sections 274–275] Speaking, as opposed to writing, has additional fea-
tures with which we must reckon in our consideration of futures. Speaking is a far
more common feature of communication both historically [10] and contempor-
aneously, for those who cannot write, for those in private or intimate situations, for
those in informal situations, for those without a means available for writing. In all
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of these cases, futures are being created through spoken language. Dediction is
present. And once again we see the proportion whereby, just as all description is
prescription, all dediction is prediction. If we push this idea a bit further and extend
it to entire branches of thought, we might notice that epistemology—”How do you
know?” is more like ethics—”Why do you believe?”
3. All description is prescription
Nietzsche provides us with reason to think that with classical civilisation we have
the very conditions that made possible our concept of science, such that we can
look back at those conditions today and recognise something. From that classical
civilisation, Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction provides an example of a
linguistic framework that functions beyond a matrix of words as labels. In response,
as Nietzsche shows us with his principle of contradiction, non-contradiction operates
in the realm of norms and values. Regarding Nietzsche’s self-professed project of
re-valuing all values, “the most fundamental ‘value’ of all [is] the principle of non-
contradiction, . . .” writes de Man in his Allegories of Reading. As a value, this
manifests itself as pre-scription, not de-scription—normative, not neutral. De Man
finds this to be manifestly clear in section 516 of Nietzsche’s The Will to Power.
We are unable to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: this is a subjective
empirical law, not the expression of any “necessity” but only of an inability.If,
according to Aristotle, the law of contradiction is the most certain of all principles,
if it is the ultimate and most basic, upon which every demonstrative proof rests,
if the principle of every axiom lies in it; then one should consider all the more
rigorously what presuppositions already lie at the bottom of it. Either it asserts
something about actuality, about being, as if one already knew this from another
source; that is, as if opposite attributes could not be ascribed to it. Or the prop-
osition means: opposite attributes should not be ascribed to it. In that case, logic
would be an imperative, not to know the true, but to posit and arrange a world
that shall be called true by us [11].
Nietzsche’s critique raises the question of how one justifies an ordering principle, if
a principle like non-contradiction is not what it purports to be. Wittgenstein connects
this question to prediction, prescription and personal motivation, when in his Philo-
sophical Investigations he shows how a prescription, a command even, can change
the course of how we necessarily must interpret subsequent action.
“I am leaving the room because you tell me to.”“I am leaving the room, but not
because you tell me to.”Does this proposition describe a connexion between my
action and his order; or does it make the connexion?Can one ask: “How do you
know that you do it because of this, or not because of this?” And is the answer
perhaps: “I feel it.” [2, section 487]
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Among Ludwig Wittgenstein’s investigations, number 487 is where we can perhaps
best see how language produces, enables and constrains futures. Statements are to
commands, as Wittgenstein demonstrates, as description is to prescription. With this
theme of the structure of language in mind, we must to consider the following mech-
anics of the structure.
Kierkegaard says that when Abraham chooses to obey God’s order, he is authoris-
ing God to command him. God has not forced Abraham to do anything. Likewise
for Sartre, the same is true when we choose to obey a law or policeman, or sign.
[8, p. 77] These observations help to illustrate how meaning is created not only by
the definitions of words, but by the social interpretation of structure, tone, and the
mechanics of language. It seems a bit strange to say that neither God nor the police-
man has forced the action. And we may be particularly surprised to find such a
statement coming from Sartre. But if we examine what has been said, we should
notice that we are talking about the creation of meaning and the authorisation for
action through commands. Commands are not commands just because of the defi-
nitions of individual words contained within them. As Saussure reminded us above,
language involves both an established system and an evolution. Moreover, individual
parts of the language in the system must be understood in the context of the system,
not as free-standing meanings. So while it may take Abraham’s authorisation to
construct God’s statement as a command, Abraham’s failure to follow the mandate
of the command will be interpreted as disobeying the command, not as some unre-
lated action. Our social use of language does not permit the hearer of a statement that
has been directed at him to ignore the preceding statement when taking subsequent
meaningful actions. A hearer cannot say that he heard the speaker, but neither agreed
nor disagreed with the statement, and simply chose to act independently. Why is
this? Because the systematic nature of the language means that every utterance is
made in the context of all language, and every speaker and every hearer is hearing
and speaking in the contexts of all speaking and hearing. That is how meanings are
created. This means that while the meaning of a statement is not solely for the
speaker to determine, as Kierkegaard and Sartre illustrate, so too it is not solely for
the hearer to determine. I would even go a step further than this, and say that while
it is true that the interpretation of meaning from speaker and hearer are necessary
for a command, so too is it necessary to have the interpretation of meaning created
by the audience? This is the case because the hearer interprets the statement in the
context of what “the audience”, real or virtual, may make of it.
Moreover, this meaning is determined by speaker, hearer and audience not only
in the definition of words, but in the structure and mechanics of language, in the
ethos of the persons involved and the social dynamics of its use, among other things.
For example, a command has a meaning different than a statement not just because
of the accumulated definitions of the words in the command, but also because of its
structure and mechanics. The audience, together with the speaker and hearer, creates
the meanings. There is more—it is not only the audience who is present during this
particular interlocution, but all audiences in the language family, who are responsible
for the meanings created.
Consequently, in the above example, even if the hearer genuinely did not hear
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the preceding statement, the audience will interpret the hearer’s actions as re-actions
to the statement. This means that the statement is functioning as a command—not
because of the content of the intentional command of the speaker, and not because
of the content of the re-actions of a wilful hearer, but because of the power of the
audience to influence the interpretive possibilities of meaning in social speaking and
hearing. This dynamic has ramifications for the speaker, listener and audience who
make up the social group. The social understanding of group language dynamics
plays a necessary and powerful force in establishing the system identified by Saus-
sure. And because we all, at one time or another, are part of the interpretive audience
that produces the system, we have contributed to the socially-constructed conditions
which remove the ability of the speaker or hearer (was it ever there?) to insist upon
his intentional will as the supreme interpretation of the definitional meaning of a
statement, and in its function as a command or statement—a prescription or a
description. In the evolution of language that Saussure regards as being essential, I
would suggest that ultimately this environment of interpretation stops the speaker or
hearer from expecting that the audience privilege the meaning that is conscious to
the intentional will of the speaker or hearer. Once that expectation is removed, we
may see that there is an element of complicity by the speaker or hearer in the dynamic
whereby the audience helps to create the meaning for both the speaker and the hearer.
In short, we have moved from the notion that the speaker controls the meaning
for the hearer, to the hearer contributing to the meaning, to the audience contributing
to the meaning. Once the speaker or hearer acknowledges this, he or she is complicit
in the audience’s construction of meaning and must surrender the expectation that
the singular, intentional will of the speaker must be privileged as the supreme
interpretation of meaning.
4. Conclusion
Throughout this essay, I have hung my arguments on a framework of Wittgenste-
in’s Philosophical Investigations. To that framework then, I give the final words. In
investigations 579–81, he writes:
The feeling of confidence. How is this manifested in behaviour?An ‘inner process’
stands in need of outward criteria.An expectation is imbedded in a situation, from
which it arises. The expectation of an explosion may, for example, arise from a
situation in which an explosion is to be expected.
In an established system that is necessary for language to have meaning, all
description is prescription. Adding “de-diction” to the etymological matrix helps to
illustrate that point. As an heuristic device that is intended to make us reflect upon
the creation of futures through language, we might want to relate it to the deceiv-
ingly-simple concept of a model. I recently asked some university students what a
fashion model has in common with a carbon molecule model—”toothpicks” was the
answer that I received. (One might need to have done primary school science a while
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ago to know that models of molecules were constructed with balls and toothpicks.)
That may in fact be the only thing that those two models have in common. We are
tricked by what appears to be the same word, but I would suggest it functions more
as a homonym. Models in science are intended to describe the world as it exists;
fashion models, as any woman (or man) will tell you, are not at all like the rest of
us—their function is normative, a prescription of how we should look, not a mirror
of how we do look. The use of the same word—model—for description and prescrip-
tion allows even the scientist to create models and then look for a world that is like
the model, rather than to make a model to look like the world. Within this notion
of modelling then, the notion of how description becomes prescription is summarised.
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